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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent victory for mortgage lenders, the United States Su-
preme Court made it more difficult for debtors and junior creditors to
set aside foreclosure sales of property when a property owner is forced
to sell the property at a foreclosure sale and then files bankruptcy
within a year of the sale.' Federal courts had formulated a variety of
methods to ascertain when a debtor may avoid a mortgage foreclosure
sale when the debtor had "received less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation."2 Courts had strug-
gled to find a balance between protecting foreclosure sale purchasers
from losing their purchase and protecting debtors from fraudulent
transactions. A divided United States Supreme Court tried to give "sen-
sible content" to 11 U.S.C. § 548 in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.'
The 5-4 majority4 held that as long as the state's foreclosure law
requirements were met, the price received at a noncollusive foreclosure
sale conclusively establishes "reasonably equivalent value" of mortgage
property.' Moreover, the majority held that "fair market value" was
not the benchmark for evaluating mortgage foreclosure sales.6 In fact,
they found fair market value to be "the very antithesis" of a forced-
sale value.7 Thus, the Court, specifically rejecting the Durrett or Bun-
dles approach,' found there to be no benchmark other than the price
received at the properly conducted foreclosure sale.
The dissent argued that the majority, by not following the intent of
Congress, was allowing a "peppercorn" to be the reasonably equivalent
1. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1766 (1994).
4. Scalia, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter filed the dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun,
Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
5. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
6. Id. at 1761.
7. Id.
8. For a discussion of the Durrett approach, see infra text accompanying notes 29-36;
for a discussion of the Bundles approach, see infra text accompanying notes 48-54.
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value for California beachfront property.9 However, the dissent, by not
endorsing any other particular valuation method, seemed to prefer that
each Bankruptcy Court decide on a case-by-case basis."
Despite the concerns of the dissent, the BFP decision will help to
bring more certainty to real estate title and foreclosure sales. Although
not answering all of the questions concerning the avoidance of foreclo-
sure sales, the decision does rule against overturning a sale for price
insufficiencies. However, now debtors and bankruptcy trustees will
focus upon any irregularities in the foreclosure sale process and not on
the property's fair market value. Therefore, it is imperative that lenders
know the applicable state law, and surpass the law's minimum provi-
sions in some instances, to help prevent the avoidance of a foreclosure
sale. The purpose of this Note is to review foreclosure sale law in
light of the BFP decision and to provide guidance to lenders on the
foreclosure sale process in West Virginia.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
There are two theories on which a real estate foreclosure sale can
be challenged: fraudulent conveyance law and state foreclosure law.
This part of the Note discusses the history of fraudulent conveyance
and state foreclosure law, the specific aspects of the federal fraudulent
conveyance law" at issue in BFP, and the various circuit courts' in-
terpretations of that section.
A. Fraudulent Transfer Law
The foundation for our federal fraudulent transfer law can be
traced to sixteenth century England. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth pro-
hibited "covinous and fraudulent" transfers intended "to delay, hinder
or defraud creditors and others."' 2 As debtors learned to avoid the
9. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1767.
10. Id. at 1772-73.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
12. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763 (citing 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570)).
3
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statute by hiding their intent, the English courts began to allow a cred-
itor to prove fraudulent intent objectively. 3 These objective indices of
intent, or "badges of fraud," were used to raise a rebuttable presump-
tion of fraudulent intent.
14
The idea of constructively proving fraud was incorporated into
American bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 specifically
adopted the language of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth'5 and these basic
principles were recognized in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in
1984.16
B. Foreclosure Law
The English Courts of Chancery developed the law of foreclosure
with the "equity of redemption," which allowed the debtor to buy back
his property after the original due date, or "law day."' 7 Because title
to forfeited property could remain clouded for years after law day, the
expanded period of redemption left lenders in a quandary.' The
courts responded by creating the equitable remedy of foreclosure,
whereby the borrower was forever foreclosed from exercising his equi-
ty of redemplion after a certain date. 9 With this remedy, known as
"strict foreclosure," "the borrower's entire interest in the property was
forfeited, regardless of any accumulated equity."2 °
The next major change in the development of foreclosure law
occurred in 19th century America. To avoid the harsh consequences of
strict foreclosure, the "foreclosure by sale" was created which provided
13. BFP, 114 S. Ct at 1763. For example: a transfer to a close relative, a transfer of
title without a change of possession, or grossly inadequate consideration. Id.
14. Id. (citing Twyne's Case, 3 Coke Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601); OR-
LANDO F. BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES: A TREATISE UPON CONVEYANCES MADE BY
DEBTORS TO DEFRAUD CREDrrORs 31-60 (1882)).
15. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67(e), 30 Stat. 564-65).
16. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANS. ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
17. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing G. GLENN, I MORTGAGES 3-18, 358-62, 395-406 (1943); G. OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES 144 (2d ed. 1970)).
[Vol. 97:255
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that any surplus over the debt be given to the debtor.2 Following the
"foreclosure by sale" principle, each state created diverse networks of
judicially and legislatively crafted rules governing the foreclosure pro-
cess to achieve what each state considered the proper balance between
the needs of lenders and borrowers.22 Currently, all states permit judi-
cial foreclosure conducted under direct judicial oversight; approximately
half of the states also permit foreclosure through a private power of
sale provided in the mortgage documents.2
Currently, although the foreclosure laws differ from state to state,
most require: notice to the borrower; a substantial period of time be-
fore the foreclosure proceedings can begin; publication of the notice of
sale; and adherence to the prescribed bidding rules and auction proce-
dures.24
C. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
BFP challenged the foreclosure sale under the.fraudulent transfer
provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (section
548). Under section 548, the trustee in bankruptcy, or the debtor in
21. Id. (citing GLENN, supra note 20, at 460-62, 622; OSBORNE, supra note 20, at
661-63).
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden,
Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 BUs. LAW. 977, 1004-05 (1984)).
24. Id. (citing Zinman, supra note 23, at 1002, 1004-05; G. OSBORNE, supra note 20,
at 683, 733-35); G. Osborne et al., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 9, 446-47, 475-77 (1979).
25. Title 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) provides in relevant part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or invol-
untarily- (1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebt-
ed; or (2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and (B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation . ...
5
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possession in a Chapter 11 case, has the power to avoid both actual
and constructively fraudulent transfers. 6 A transfer is deemed actually
fraudulent and can be set aside if the trustee establishes that there was
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.""z7 A transfer can be set
aside for constructive fraud if the trustee can establish:
(1) that the debtor had an interest in the property; (2) that a transfer of
that interest occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion; (3) that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or be-
came insolvent as a result thereof; and (4) that the debtor received "less
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."'"
The focus of BFP was on the requirement of "reasonably equivalent
value" found in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). This phrase, undefined in
the code, had resulted in a split among the circuits as to its meaning
and applicability.
D. Determining "Reasonably Equivalent Value"
Prior to the BFP decision, the courts had formulated several ap-
proaches to determine what constituted a "reasonably equivalent value"
under section 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, most
courts followed one of three approaches for determining whether a
transfer was voidable for receiving less than a reasonably equivalent
value. These three predominant approaches were Durrett, Bundles, and
Madrid, which are discussed in detail below.
1. The Durrett Approach
One approach used to determine if reasonably equivalent value was
received at a foreclosure sale of real estate was the "Durrett approach"
or the "seventy-percent test." This test established that a foreclosure
sale yielding less than seventy-percent of the fair market value of the
26. BFP was concerned with the constructive fraud provision regarding transfers by
insolvent debtors. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1760.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
28. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1760 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988)).
[Vol. 97:255
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property was a fraudulent transfer for lack of reasonably equivalent
value.29 The Durrett approach was derived from dicta in Durrett v.
Washington National Insurance Co." In Durrett, the Court stated that
it had been unable to locate any decision by a court that did not avoid
a foreclosure sale of real estate yielding less than seventy-percent of
the property's fair market value. Although the court's statements were
dicta, these statements were construed to establish a seventy-percent
test." The Durrett approach had been followed in the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits,32 and had also been approved by a Bankruptcy Court in
at least one federal district where the Court of Appeals of that circuit
had not expressly decided the issue.3
The Durrett approach, more so than the other approaches, poten-
tially preserved more of the debtor's assets for distribution to the unse-
cured creditors. 4 However, the approach was criticized as creating a
de facto federal right of redemption in the trustee for a one-year peri-
29. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Standard Bldg. Assocs., Ltd., 87 B.R. 221,
223 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
30. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
31. E.g., In re General Indus., Inc., 79 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Wil-
lis, 48 B.R. 295 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Standard Bldg.
Assocs., Ltd., 87 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Wheeler, 34 B.R. 818 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Park N. Partners, Ltd., 72 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987), vacated
on other grounds, 80 B.R 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). See 9A AM. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy
§ 1857 (1991), for a general overview.
32. In re Willis, 48 B.R. 295 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n.
v. Standard Bldg. Assocs., Ltd., 87 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Coleman, 21
B.R. 832 (Bankr. Tex. 1982); In re Ocean Dev. of America, Inc., 22 B.R. 834 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982), reh'g denied, 24 B.R. 51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.); In re Perdidio Bay Country Club
Estates, Inc., 23 B.R. 36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Wheeler, 34 B.R. 818 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1983); In re Park North Partners, Ltd., 72 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987), vacated
on other grounds, 80 B.R. 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.). See 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1857
(1991).
33. In re Berge, 33 B.R. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.), motion granted in part, modified
on other grounds, 37 B.R. 705 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
34. Martha Lassiter Sewell, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales Under Section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Balancing of Interests, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1011, 1025 (1992).
7
Perry: BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation: Supreme Court Shifts Focus o
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994
WEST VIRGiNIA LAW REVIEW
od 5 and of inviting "federal intrusion into an area of law traditionally
controlled by the States.
36
2. The Madrid Approach
A second approach to reasonably equivalent value is the "Madrid
approach." This approach was derived from In re Madrid,37 in which
the court held that the price received at a noncollusive and regularly
conducted foreclosure sale is conclusively presumed to be a reasonably
equivalent value for the property sold. The Madrid approach is based
primarily on the policy consideration that subjecting properly conducted
foreclosure sales to attack as fraudulent transfers would, in effect, cre-
ate a "de facto right of redemption" in the trustee." Such a right
would significantly chill participation at foreclosure sales, depress pric-
es obtained at the sales, and increase deficiency judgments.39 Addi-
tionally, courts following the Madrid approach reasoned that to hold
otherwise would create "negative repercussions" in the lending arena
because "creditors would be less willing to lend funds on the security
of a mortgage or deed of trust."4 The Ninth Circuit continues to fol-
low the Madrid approach.4" The Sixth Circuit, in dictum, adopted the
reasonably equivalent value presumption,42 and several Bankruptcy
Courts in circuits where the question had not been answered approved
of the Madrid approach.
43
35. William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal
Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257, 265 (1985).
36. Johnny L. Woodruff, Certiorari to In re BFP: The Eve of Decision to a Dozen
Years of Durrett Conflict - Will Resolution of the Issue Solve the Real Problem?, 24 MEM.
ST. U. L. REV. '773, 787 (1994).
37. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
38. In re New Yorketown Assocs., 40 B.R. 701 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Robin-
son, 80 B.R. 455 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1987).
39. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1858 (1991).
40. Id. at § 1858. See also In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir.
1985); In re Ristich, 57 B.R. 568 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1986); In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1984); In re Vema, 58 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1986).
41. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985).
43. See, e.g., In re Upham, 48 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Ristich,
[Vol. 97:255
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The Madrid approach provides finality and stability to real estate
foreclosure sales" and preserves the integrity of state real estate
law.45 However, it has been criticized for giving too much deference
to state foreclosure law46 and allowing the purchaser at a sale to re-
ceive a windfall at the expense of unsecured creditors.47
3. The Bundles Approach
The third major approach, from the Seventh Circuit decision In re
Bundles, 48 determined that the decision of reasonably equivalent value
must be reached on a ease-by-case basis. According to the Bundles
approach, the court must examine the facts surrounding the sale after
an evidentiary hearing, with a rebuttable presumption that the foreclo-
sure sale price is sufficient. Courts following this case-by-case ap-
proach, found "reasonably equivalent value" to be an elusive concept
which could not be determined, as with the Durrett approach, solely on
the basis of whether a foreclosure sale yielded a given percentage of
market value.49 The case-by-case approach had been adopted by the
Seventh"0 and Eighth5 Circuits, as well as by several federal district
and bankruptcy courts in other circuits.52 In fact, at one time the case-
57 B.R. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1986); In re Vema, 58 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D. Cal.
1986). See 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1858 (1991).
44. Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Ac-
commodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933, 955 (1985).
45. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 789.
46. Sewell, supra note 34, at 1027.
47. Woodruff; supra note 36, at 790.
48. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
49. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1860 (1991).
50. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
51. In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984).
52. See, e.g., In re Richard, 26 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re Ruebeck, 55
B.R. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re General Indus., Inc., 79 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987); In re Carr, 40 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In re Adwar, 55 B.R. 111
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Pruitt, 72 B.R. 436 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Jones, 20
B.R. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re New Yorketown Assocs., 40 B.R. 701 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1984); In re Smith, 24 B.R. 19 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); In re Garrison, 48 B.R. 837
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); Lower Downtown Assocs., L.P. v. Brazosbanc Say. Ass'n, 52 B.R.
9
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by-case approach seemed to be the "emerging majority view."'53 Al-
though a balance between the extremes of Durrett and Madrid, the
Bundles approach had been criticized for creating uncertainty in fore-
closure sales."
4. After BFP
The BFP decision specifically rejected the Durrett and Bundles
approaches55 while affirming the Ninth Circuit's Madrid approach. 6
Because the Court in BFP specifically limited its ruling to mortgage
foreclosures of real estate,57 it may not be applicable to other types of
foreclosure or forced sales. It is clear, however, that in determining the
reasonably equivalent value for a mortgage foreclosure of real estate,
the Madrid approach is the law of the land.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1987, Wayne and Marlene Pedersen and Russell Bartone formed
a partnership, BFP, for the purpose of buying a home in Newport
Beach, California. They had hoped to renovate and sell the property
for a quick profit.5" BFP acquired title to the house, subject to a first
deed of trust in favor of Imperial Savings Association for $356,250"9
and a second deed of trust to the sellers, Sheldon and Ann Foreman
for $200,000.60 When BFP failed to make the monthly payments to
Imperial Savings, a notice of foreclosure was issued. The foreclosure
proceedings were temporarily delayed when Imperial was declared
insolvent. The Resolution Trust Corporation was appointed as the re-
662 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). See also 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1860 (1991).
53. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1860 (1991).
54. Sewell, supra note 34, at 1030.
55. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62.
56. Id at 1767.
57. Id. at 1761 n.3.
58. For a further explanation of the circumstances behind BFP, see James S. Gmnelli,
Partners Take Gamble - and Lose, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at D1.
59. This amount represents a loan to the Pedersons for the purchase of the home.
BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1759.
60. This amount represented a promissory note. Id.
[Vol. 97:255
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ceiver of Imperial. At the foreclosure sale of the BFP property on July
12, 1989, Paul Osborne purchased the home for $433,000.61
Three months after the foreclosure sale, BFP filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy and petitioned the bankruptcy court to set aside the sale to
Osborne as a fraudulent transfer. BFP argued that the home was worth
over $725,000 at the time of the sale, and that $433,000 was not a
"reasonably equivalent value" and thus constituted a fraudulent convey-
ance under 11 U.S.C. § 548.62 Finding that the foreclosure sale had
been properly conducted under California law without collusion or
fraud, the bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint against Osborne
and granted summary judgment in favor of Imperial.63 The district
court affirmed Osborne's motion to dismiss,'M and a divided bankrupt-
cy appellate panel affirmed Imperial's motion for summary judg-
ment.65 Utilizing the Madrid approach,66 the panel majority found
that a "non-collusive and regularly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure
sale . . . cannot be challenged as a fraudulent conveyance because the
consideration received in such a sale establishes 'reasonably equivalent
value' as a matter of law."67 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
solidated the two BFP appeals and affirmed both.68 BFP then filed a
petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted
in May, 1993.69
IV. THE DECISION
The United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case in
order to settle a dispute between the circuits as to the meaning of
61. Id.
62. Id. See supra note 25 for text of statute.
63. BFP, 114 S. Ct at 1759.
64. Id.
65. BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n, 132 B.R. 748 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
66. See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
67. BFP, 132 B.R. at 750 (citing Madrid, 21 B.R. at 424).
68. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. 113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993).
11
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"reasonably equivalent value" in the context of fraudulent transfer law.
Specifically, the Court considered whether the 11 U.S.C. § 548 re-
quirement that transfers of property by insolvent debtors within one
year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition be in exchange for "a
reasonably equivalent value," was satisfied by the price received at a
properly conducted, noncollusive, real estate mortgage foreclosure
sale.7" The Court affirmed the decisions of the three lower courts and
held that the consideration received at a properly conducted sale con-
clusively establishes "reasonably equivalent value" for purposes of 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).
71
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, ,joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice
Ginsburg, wrote the indignant dissent. The two high-spirited opinions
reflect the difficulty that a court faces when it attempts to balance the
rights of lenders, debtors, and purchasers in the foreclosure sale pro-
cess.
A. The Majority Opinion: Foreclosure Sale Price is Conclusive
The majority first looked at the code section in question: 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).' After determining that "transfer" includes a fore-
closure sale,73 the Court sought to define the Code term "reasonably
equivalent value." Since only the word "value" is defined within the
code section,74 the Court reviewed the definitions of "reasonably
equivalent" used by the circuit courts.
The discussion began, with Durrett v. Washington National Insur-
ance Co.75 and the seventy-percent approach. The Court then com-
pared the Durrett approach to the In re Bundles76 line of cases,
70. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
71. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
72. See supra note 25 for the text of the statute.
73. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1760.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1988).
75. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
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wherein the Seventh Circuit rejected the Durrett approach in favor of a
case-by-case, "all facts and circumstances" approach to the question of
reasonably equivalent value.77 The opinion listed several other alterna-
tive approaches, 78 but concentrated primarily on Durrett and Bundles
since both measured reasonably equivalent value against fair market
value in determining the propriety of the sale.79 The majority opined
that the use of fair market value as determinative of reasonably equiv-
alent value was inconsistent with the text of the Bankruptcy Code. °
Because the term "fair market value" does not appear in section 548,
while the term does appear in other sections of the Code," the major-
ity reasoned, therefore, that Congress went "out of its way" to avoid
that standard term and instead chose the "entirely novel phrase 'rea-
sonably equivalent value."'8 2
Furthermore, the majority reasoned that market value has no appli-
cability in the forced-sale context 3 because "'[flair market value' pre-
sumes market conditions that, by definition, simply [cannot be ob-
tained] in the context of a forced sale."8 4 Both Durrett and Bundles
failed to "come to grips with this glaring discrepancy between the
factors relevant to an appraisal of a property's market value, on the
one hand, and the strictures of the foreclosure process on the other." 5
The majority asserted that when all of these factors were considered,
property that must be sold within the time and manner strictures of
state-prescribed foreclosures are "simply worth less."'86 Furthermore,
the majority remarked that "no one would pay as much to own such
77. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1760; see supra text accompanying notes 29-54.
78. Id. at 1760.
79. Id. at 1761.
80. Id.
81. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).




86. Id. at 1762.
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property as he would pay to own real estate that could be sold at lei-
sure and pursuant to normal marketing techniques.
8 7
The majority then looked at other possible constructions of reason-
ably equivalent value. They considered whether there could be a "rea-
sonable" forced-sale price.88 The majority thought that perhaps this
was the source of Durrett and Bundles' reasoning. 9 However, the ma-
jority found that a "reasonable" forced-sale price construction repre-
sented "policy determinations which the Bankruptcy Code gives no
apparent authority to make."9 °. The majority reasoned that how closely
a price received at a foreclosure sale approximated its fair market val-
ue was dependent upon the terms of the forced sale.9' However, be-
cause the terms of foreclosure sales differ from state to state, estab-
lishing a federal "reasonable" foreclosure-sale price would "extend
federal bankruptcy law well beyond the traditional field of fraudulent
transfers, into realms of policy where it has not ventured before."9
The majority asserted that to hold that the "reasonably equivalent
value" language in section 548(a)(2) required a certain minimum price
beyond state foreclosure law would be to claim that the Bankruptcy
Code had adopted Durrett or Bundles.93 The majority refused to pre-
sume such a "radical departure" from the Code's plain language with-
out clearer textual guidance.94
The majority found an essential state interest at issue in that "the
general welfare of society is involved in the security of the titles to
real estate"95 and to hold otherwise would cause a "federally created
cloud" over every title of realty purchased at a foreclosure sale.96




90. Id. at 1762-63.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1763.
93. Id. at 1764.
94. Id.
95. Id at 1764 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 60 (1911)).
96. Id. at 1765.
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majority held that the Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted to adopt
the pre-existing state law.97
The majority declined to read the phrase "reasonably equivalent
value" in section 548(a)(2) to mean, as applied to mortgage foreclosure
sales, either "fair market value" or "fair foreclosure price," whether
calculated as a percentage of fair market value or otherwise." Instead,
the Court held that the price received at a foreclosure sale conforming
to the applicable state foreclosure laws conclusively establishes "rea-
sonably equivalent value" for the purposes of section 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.99
The majority insisted that this conclusion did not render section
548 superfluous, as the dissent argued,' because the "reasonably
equivalent value" criterion would continue to have independent mean-
ing outside the foreclosure context.' In other words, section
548(a)(2) would continue to be an exclusive means of invalidating
some foreclosure sales because, if the sale was set aside for violating
state procedural laws, then the price at the sale loses its conclusive
force. ' 2
The last portion of the majority's opinion was dedicated to a gen-
eral response to the dissent. After pointing out that "one searches Jus-
tice Souter's opinion in vain for any alternative response to the ques-
tion of the transferred property's worth,"'0 3 the majority noted that it
was the "proper function of this Court to give 'sensible content' to the
provisions of the United States Code."'0 4 The majority opinion con-
cluded with a summary argument for their decision: The "reasonably
equivalent value" inquiry is applicable to all transfers, but the strictures
of foreclosure sales affect a property's worth by "completely redefining
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1765.
100. Id. at 1770. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
101. Id. at 1765.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1766.
104. Id.
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the market in which the property is offered for sale.' ' 5 Therefore,
the usual benchmark of a property's worth (fair market value) is inap-
plicable and "the only legitimate evidence of the property's value at
the time it is sold is the foreclosure sale price itself." '1 6
B. The Dissent: An Implausible Proposition
The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning was implausible
and in "derogation of the straightforward language used by Con-
gress."' °7 The dissent noted that Congress, in the course of amending
the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, considered, but did not enact, an
amendment that said "precisely what the majority now says the current
provision means."'08 The dissent noted that, "even if one is careful
not to attach too much significance to such a legislative nonoccurrence,
it surely cautions against undue reliance on a different, entirely specu-
lative congressional 'omission."" 9 Furthermore, the dissent urged that
the words and meaning of section 548(a)(2) were clear."0 The dissent
asserted that an ordinary person conversant with the English language
would conclude that the provision required the court to compare the
price received with the worth of the item and to set aside the transfer
if the former was unreasonably less than the latter."'
Moreover, the dissent complained that the majority was creating a
foreclosure-sale exception in section 548(a)(2), through the use of a
narrowed construction of the section." 2 Although the dissent agreed
with the majority that foreclosure sales usually do obtain comparatively
lower prices than other transfers and that every such sale should not be
set aside,"3 the dissent argued that rejection of this option did not
necessarily lead to the majority's alternative that avoidance be allowed
105. Id- at 1767.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1767 n.1. See S. 445, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 360 (1983).
109. Id. at 1767 n.1.
110. Id. at 1763.
111. Id. at 1768-69.
112. Id. at 1767.
113. Id at 1767-68.
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only where the foreclosure sale was collusive or had failed to comply
with state foreclosure laws."' The dissent argued that simply meeting
the majority's criteria did not guarantee that the sale has produced a
price "reasonably equivalent" to the value of the property."5
The dissent also argued that if the majority view was correct, there
would be no need for the 1984 amendments' because, if a
property's value is conclusively presumed to be whatever it is sold for,
then the question of "less than reasonably equivalent value" would
never be worth asking in a real estate foreclosure context." 7
Furthermore, the dissent expressed confidence that bankruptcy
courts were competent to determine whether "reasonably equivalent
value" was received." 8 The dissent noted that the bankruptcy courts
"regularly make comparably difficult (and contestable) determinations
about the 'reasonably equivalent value' of assets transferred through
other means than foreclosure sales.""19
The dissent focused in on what they believed to be the underlying
principle of the Bankruptcy Code: fair balance between rights of credi-
tors and debtors.' They noted that avoiding procedurally regular
foreclosure sales for inadequate prices was "consistent with those poli-
cies of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for credi-
tors . . . which the Court has often said are at the core of federal
bankruptcy law."'
2'
In conclusion, the dissent agreed with the majority that BFP in-
volved a choice between two possible statutory provisions:
114. l at 1768.
115. Id. at 1767-68.
116. The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments include involuntary transfers within a trustee's
section 548 avoidance powers and provide that the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of re-
demption is a "transfer." Martin I. Klein, The Demise of "Durrett," N.Y.L.J., June 13,
1994, at I [hereinafter Klein].
117. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1770.
118. Id. at 1772.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1774.
121. Id.
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[O]ne authorizing the trustee to avoid involuntary transfers for less than a
reasonably equivalent value,' 2 and another precluding such avoidance
when a secured party or third party purchaser obtains title to an interest of
the debtor in property pursuant to a good faith prepetition foreclosure
proceeding permitting the realization of security upon default of the bor-
rower.
23
However, the dissent argued that the choice was made by Congress in
1984 when it enacted the former alternative rather than the latter. The
dissent concluded that the court, therefore, should apply the statute "as
Congress wrote it.'1
2 4
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The United States Supreme Court denied the debtor's petition for
rehearing,' z therefore, one must evaluate mortgage foreclosure law in
light of the BFP decision. This part of the Note addresses BFP's ap-
plicability and impact on mortgage lenders in general and then specifi-
cally focuses on what BFP will mean to mortgage lenders in West
Virginia.
A. BFP's Applicability to Bids by Mortgagees
The BFP decision was decided in the context of a third-party
purchaser, therefore, there may be some question as to its applicability
to foreclosure bids by mortgagees. The majority in BFP reasoned that
since the price of foreclosed property is "simply worth less" than prop-
erty in a free market context, then the price received at the sale must
represent the property's reasonably equivalent value. However, as ex-
plained below, when a foreclosure sale is simply the mortgagee bidding
on its own collateral, this argument may lose some of its force.'26
122. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988). See also supra note 25.
123. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1777-78 (quoting S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 360 (1983))
(citations omitted).
124. Id. at 1778.
125. 114 S. Ct. 2771 (1994).
126. Kenneth M. Block & Jeffrey B. Steiner, Ending the Threat of "Durrett," N.Y.L.J.,
July 20, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Block].
[Vol. 97:255
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss1/10
1994] STATE LAW FOCUS ON MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALES 273
The economic interests of a foreclosing mortgagee are in opposi-
tion to those of the debtor and his other creditors: 2 7 first, the mort-
gagee lacks incentive to bid more than the amount of the indebtedness
because any surplus will be turned over to the debtor or junior credi-
tors and second, if the mortgagee can purchase the property for the
amount of the indebtedness and resell the property, any profits can be
kept as a windfall.' Considering these factors, courts may find the
majority's "free market" rationale difficult to accept. Indeed, some
courts prior to BFP only allowed the conclusive presumption of rea-
sonably equivalent value if a third party purchaser was the successful
bidder at the foreclosure sale.129 Additionally, closer scrutiny may
occur in "mortgagee-only-bidder" sales because the bankruptcy trustees
will now argue that such sales are collusive, whereas before, the trustee
may have been content with the "inadequate" price argument to set
aside the sale.
Fortunately for the mortgagee, the free market theory was not the
only rationale the Supreme Court gave for its decision in BFP. The
Court also held that states, having a legitimate interest in protecting the
titles of real estate, should set all parameters on forced sale prices. The
majority held that without clearer textual guidance from Congress,
federal courts could not displace state law. Clearly then, if the sale
could have only been challenged under state law in the context of a
third-party purchaser, it is unlikely that federal law would apply in
cases where the mortgagee is the purchaser. 3 ' Thus, the BFP deci-
sion should apply to foreclosing mortgagees with equal effect as to
third-party bidders. Therefore, mortgagees shoujd be allowed to take
127. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1775.
128. Block, supra note 126, at 5.
129. Robert A. Glaves, The Controversy Over Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code in
the Mortgage Arena: Making the Case for a Federal Statute Reforming the Foreclosure
Process, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 683, 698 (1990).
130. Block, supra note 126, at 6.
19
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advantage of the conclusive presumption of "reasonably equivalent value."
B. BFP's Impact on Mortgage Lenders
The Supreme Court's decision in BFP restored confidence in the
finality of forced sales and freed mortgagees from the burden of ob-
taining a certain percentage of fair market value in order to sell fore-
closed property.' Prior to BFP, security of title was placed in jeop-
ardy by providing unhappy debtors the weapon of bankruptcy litigation
even after all state remedies were utilized. However, BFP does not
ensure finality to the process. Although lenders and purchasers at fore-
closure sales now have another arrow in their defensive arsenal, there
are still ways for an unhappy debtor or junior creditor to attack the
validity of the sale. BFP shifts the disgruntled debtor or junior
creditor's attention from the foreclosure sale price to the foreclosure
procedure. Trustees in bankruptcy will now focus their efforts on find-
ing fault with the foreclosure sale procedure and on using state fore-
closure law as their weapon.' Also, it is important to remember that
BFP dealt only with the Bankruptcy Code; challenges under state fore-
closure law (suits in equity) may remain unaffected by the BFP deci-
sion. 1
33
Nevertheless, BFP is a definite victory for the mortgage lender. It
provides Supreme Court authority that the Bankruptcy Code does not
provide for a challenge of inadequate price at a foreclosure sale.'
34
However, since the focus will now be upon whether the sale was con-
ducted according to state foreclosure law, 5 it is imperative that the
131. Block, supra note 126, at 7.
132. See Barr v. Allen, 170 B.R. 772, 776 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (because of the
BFP decision, the only issue was whether the foreclosure sale was "accordant procedurally
and substantively with applicable South Carolina state foreclosure law"). Price may still
become a factor in determining whether a sale should be set aside, but the challenge is
under state foreclosure law, not federal bankruptcy law. Id.
133. The holding of BFP regarding "reasonably equivalent value" only applies to the
Federal Bankruptcy Code, and thus challenges under state foreclosure law that the price
received at a foreclosure sale was so low as to "shock the conscience" of the court are still
viable, but are beyond the scope of this Note.
134. When state foreclosure sale procedures have been met, a challenge for inadequacy
of sale price can only be brought under state foreclosure and not under the fraudulent trans-
fer law of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763.
135. See supra note 132.
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lender know the applicable state foreclosure laws to help ensure that
the foreclosure sale will withstand procedural attack.
C. Foreclosure Sale Requirements in West Virginia
The conclusive presumption of "reasonably equivalent value" pro-
vided by BFP is contingent upon the requirement that the sale must
satisfy the state's foreclosure law. Thus, mortgage lenders and their
lawyers must review the applicable state law. For simplification, the
foreclosure sale process in West Virginia will be divided into three
steps: notice, sale, and recording of documents.
1. Notice
Adequate notice is crucial in preventing the avoidance of a fore-
closure sale because the notice undertaken represents the best opportu-
nity with which the mortgage lender can show to the court that rea-
sonable measures were taken to try to ensure that third parties were
notified of the sale. The West Virginia Code provides that:
Every notice of sale by a trustee under a trust deed shall show the follow-
ing particulars: (a) the time and place of sale; (b) the names of the parties
to the deed under which it will be made; (c) date of the deed; (d) the
office and book in which it is recorded; (e) the quantity and description of
the land or other property or both conveyed thereby; and (f) the terms of
sale. 136
136. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994).
If a title search has revealed any federal or state tax liens, then special notice proce-
dures must be followed. Concerning tax liens, the BFP majority expressly stated that it was
only determining "reasonably equivalent value" in the context of mortgage foreclosure sales
and that other forced sales may be different. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761 n.3. However, some
courts have held that the BFP decision does apply with equal force to tax foreclosures. See
In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78 (Bankr. D.N.J 1994); In re T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 1994 WL
456767 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994). But see In re Butler, 1994 WL 446044 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1994) ("BFP may not be applicable with respect to tax sales . . . this question can be
revisited at and following trial").
21
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Regarding the terms of sale, the West Virginia Code requires that the
sale be conducted upon the terms set forth in the deed of trust, or by
the terms set forth in Section 38-1-5.7 Case law construing Section
38-1-5 suggests that generally, flexibility is allowed in the terms of
sale specified in the deed of trust, but whatever the terms, they must
be strictly followed.' The most frequent term of sale used is cash in
hand on the day of the sale.
a. Publication
After the notice of sale has been prepared, the West Virginia Code
requires that it be published and served. 39 The Code currently man-
dates that the notice be published as a Class II legal advertisement in
an authorized publication for the county in which the property is locat-
ed. 4' If the publication or the service requirements in the deed of
trust are greater than those imposed by statute, then the deed con-
trols."4' Additionally, the Code requires that the publisher provide an
affidavit of publication evidencing publication of the notice of sale.'
137. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-5 (1985), terms of sale for real property if none are men-
tioned in the deed:
[O]ne third of the purchase money cash in hand, one third thereof, with interest, in
one year, and the residue thereof, with interest, in two years from the day of sale,
taking from the purchaser his notes, with good security, for the deferred payments,
and either retaining the legal title as further security or conveying the legal title
and reserving in the deed of conveyance a lien for the deferred purchase money,
or otherwise securing the same.
Id.
138. See Lallance v. Fisher, 2 S.E. 775 (W. Va. 1887) (if deed provided for a sale by
cash, a sale by credit is invalid).
139. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 59-3-1 et seq. (1985).
140. A class II legal advertisement is an advertisement published once a week for two
consecutive weeks prior to the sale. W. VA. CODE § 59-3-2 (Supp. 1994). Under recent
amendments, posting of the notice on the courthouse door is no longer adequate. See State
ex rel. Thomas v. Neal, 299 S.E.2d' 23 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that such service was insuf-
ficient notice).
141. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994).
142. W. VA. CODE § 59-3-4(a) (Supp. 1994).
276 [Vol. 97:255
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b. Service
The West Virginia Code requires that a copy of the notice of sale
be served upon the grantor and upon any subordinate lienholder who
has previously notified the primary lienholder of its claim at least
twenty days prior to the sale.'43 Again, if the deed of trust or other
related loan documents provide for greater notice or publication re-
quirements than the statute, then the documents will control.' 44 The
notice is deemed complete when mailed by certified mail, return re-
ceipt requested, directed to the grantors at the address shown in the
deed of trust or in a writing delivered to the beneficiary of the__eed of
trust subsequent to the execution and delivery of the trust deed.'
41
2. The Sale
The actual foreclosure sale is a relatively simple process. It must
be conducted on the date, and at the time and place specified in the
notice of sale (which in turn must be in accordance with the agree-
ments of the parties as set forth in the deed of trust or other related
documents).
1 46
At the appointed time and place, the trustee begins the sale by
reading a copy of the notice of sale. The trustee then offers the prop-
erty for sale to the highest bidder. 47 At the conclusion of the bid-
143. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994). But see Joy v. Chessie Employees Fed.
Credit Union, 411 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1991) (eighteen days notice to grantor was found
reasonable).
144. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994).
145. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994). Other methods of service are permitted but
they are expressly stated to be "in addition to, but not in lieu of' service by certified mail.
Id.
146. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-3 (1985).
147. The trustee may obtain the assistance of an auctioneer to cry the sale although the
trustee must actually ring down the sale. See Copelan v. Sohn, 82 S.E. 1016 (W. Va.
1912).
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ding, the trustee announces that the bidding is closed, as well as the
name of the purchaser and the dollar amount of the bid.
After payment of the purchase price, the trustee must prepare,
execute, and deliver a deed conveying the property sold to the success-
ful bidder, properly apply the proceeds of sale, and make a report of
the sale.'48 The West *Virginia Code provides that the trustee's ex-
penses of sale are entitled to be paid first from the proceeds,'49 in-
cluding: (1) the cost of publishing the notice of sale; (2) the cost of
certified mailing of the notice of sale or other service of the notice;
(3) the trustee's fee; 5 ' (4) transfer stamps; (5) cost of deed prepara-
tion; and (6) auctioneer's expenses and costs.
After payment of the trustee's expenses, the balance is then ap-
plied to the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust under which the
foreclosure has occurred. If there is a surplus, the Code directs that the
trustee pay the: surplus "to the grantor, his heirs, personal representa-
tives or assigns, as their interests may appear."''
Thomas F[. Gilpin,'52 a West Virginia seminar speaker on the
subject of foreclosure sales, suggests that, although not required by
statute, some additional precautions should be observed.'53 These ex-
tra steps may help prevent subsequent factual disputes and litigation.
For example, immediately prior to conducting the foreclosure sale, the
title to the subject property should be updated to rule out any new
problems. Also prior to the sale, the trustee should confirm that the
beneficiary (mortgagee) has received no notice of bankruptcy, injunc-
tion or the like, and that the beneficiary has received the publisher's
affidavit. These final preparations help to reassure the lender that all
148. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-8 (1985). A sample form of the trustee's deed is found in
W. VA. CODE § 38-1-6 (1985).
149. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-7 (1985).
150. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-7 (1985) provides that the trustee's fee shall be 5% on the
first $300.00 and 2% on the residue.
151. Id.
152. Thomas H. Gilpin, Partner, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Hunting-
ton, W. Va.
153. Thomas H. Gilpin, Real Properly Foreclosure Procedures, Continuing Legal Educa-
tion Address, Charleston, NV. Va. (June 15, 1994) [hereinafter Gilpin].
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the necessary steps have been taken and to reduce subsequent prob-
lems.
At the foreclosure sale, the trustee should make a record of the
persons in attendance, the individuals making any bid, and the value of
the bids. This extra effort in record keeping may prevent a later factual
dispute about the sale. Also, once the bidding is closed, the purchaser
and trustee should immediately meet to make arrangements for the
payment of the purchase price.'54
Finally, although as stated previously, the West Virginia Code
directs that the trustee pay any surplus "to the grantor, his heirs, per-
sonal representatives or assigns," caution should be exercised. If there
are subsequent lienholders and a surplus from the sale proceeds, it is
risky for a trustee to make a determination as to which of the various
parties is entitled to the surplus. In such circumstances, the safest
course for the trustee may be to institute an interpleader action in the
circuit court of the county where the property was sold and let the
court determine who is entitled to the proceeds. 5
3. Recording of Documents
The West Virginia Code requires that the trustee make a report of
the sale within two months after the sale is completed.'56 The report
of sale should include: (1) the publisher's affidavit certifying that the
notice of sale had been published; (2) a recital by the trustee that no-
tice was served upon the parties required to be served under West
Virginia Code Section 38-1-4; and (3) a detailed accounting of the
proceeds of the sale, including the amount of the proceeds paid to the
holder of the lien upon which foreclosure was made.'57 The trustee
154. See Fleming v. Holt, 12 W. Va. 143, 156 (1877) (holding that trustee sale is
complete when the trustee accepts the bid and signs the memorandum of sale).
155. See W. VA. CODE § 38-1-7 (1985); Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Smallridge, 175
S.E.2d 446, 451 (NV. Va. 1970).
156. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-8 (1985). If the trustee fails to record the proper account,
his commission can be forfeited. Id
157. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-8 (1985). If the beneficiary was the successful bidder of the
25
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should execute this report and record it with the Clerk of the County
Commission of the county where the deed of trust was first record-
ed.1
58
D. Real Estate Foreclosure Law in West Virginia
In West Virginia, suits challenging the price received at a real
estate foreclosure sale can be raised under the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, "'59 the West Virginia's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 6 '
and suits in equity under the state's foreclosure laws. Since the Bank-
ruptcy Code concerns the federal court system and is discussed in
BFP, this part of the Note discusses only the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act and suits in equity as applicable to West Virginia.
1. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
In an attempt to provide uniformity of law among the states, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) in 1984.6 West Vir-
ginia adopted its version of UFTA in 1986.162 The West Virginia
UFTA provides for transfers which are fraudulent as to present and
future creditors, remedies of the creditors, and defenses of the transfer-
ee. With regard to its provision for the price received at a transfer, the
West Virginia. UFTA uses the same phrase found in the Bankruptcy
Code: "reasonably equivalent value." However, unlike the Bankruptcy
Code, the West Virginia UFTA defines the phrase in the Code:
[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an
interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted,
noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the ac-
sale, then a statement that a credit to the amount owed for the remaining proceeds should
be made.
158. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-8 to -9 (1985).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
160. W. VA. CODE § 40-IA-1 to -12 (Supp. 1994).
161. UNF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
162. W. VA. CODE § 40-IA-1 to -12 (Supp. 1994).
[Vol. 97:255280
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quisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a
mortgage, deed of trust or security agreement.'63
Thus, the West Virginia UFTA is in agreement with the holding in
BFP regarding "reasonably equivalent value."
2. Suits in Equity
Through case law, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has applied a "shock the conscience" test to suits in equity challenging
the validity of a foreclosure sale. This test is summarized as:
A sale of real estate by a trustee will not be set aside upon the ground of
inadequacy of price unless such inadequacy is so great as to shock the
conscience of the chancellor. Such a sale will not be disturbed where the
price realized is approximately three fourths of the estimated value of the
property.'"
This language has caused some West Virginia lenders not to bid less
than seventy-five percent of the appraised value at a foreclosure sale
for fear of having the sale set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. How-
ever, a more detailed review of the applicable cases reveals that the
cited case merely upholds a sale of approximately three fourths of the
estimated value, as opposed to establishing a seventy-five percent floor
and, in fact, bases its decision upon an earlier case which found that a
Osale of approximately one half of the value did not "shock the con-
science" of the court.' 65
163. NV. VA. CODE § 40-1A-3(b) (Supp. 1994).
164. Rife v. Woolfolk, 289 S.E.2d 220, 223 (W. Va. 1982) (quoting Pence v. Jamison,
94 S.E. 383, 384, Syl. Pt. 9 (NV. Va. 1917)) (emphasis added).
165. As discussed supra note 164, Rife was quoting from a syllabus point in Pence.
Pence involved a challenge that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was grossly inadequate
and that the sale should be set aside. The Court looked at Lallance v. Fisher, 2 S.E. 775
(W. Va. 1887) (upholding a sale for one half of the estimated value) and Copelan v. Sohn,
82 S.E. 1016 (W. Va. 1912) (upholding sale for one half of the estimated value) in con-
cluding that a sale price of three fourths of the market value did not "shock the con-
science."
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The most recent Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia deci-
sion on this issue, Benavides v. Shenandoah Federal Savings,'66 does
not refer to any set percentage, but does reaffirm the shock the con-
science test. Thus, it could be argued that the "shock the conscience"
test in West Virginia considers the facts and circumstances of the indi-
vidual case, much like the Bundles approach, instead of a Durrett min-
imum percentage approach.
To summarize, in West Virginia, challenges of price at real estate
foreclosure sales can be made under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, the
West Virginia Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (WVUFTA), or suits
in equity. After the United States Supreme Court's ruling in BFP, both
the Bankruptcy Code and WVUFTA provide that the price received at
a properly conducted, noncollusive sale conclusively establishes a "rea-
sonably equivalent value." However, the rule is less clear in suits in
equity in West Virginia, where the courts apply a "shock the con-
science" test to the sales.'
6 7
E. Recommendations to West Virginia Lenders
With regard to mortgage foreclosures, the BFP decision supplied
the same conclusive presumption of "reasonably equivalent value" to
the Federal Bankruptcy Code as found in the WVUFTA. Thus, the
fraudulent conveyance focus will now, more than ever, be upon wheth-
er the foreclosure sale was in accordance with the applicable state
166. 433 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1993).
167. The holding of BFP regarding "reasonably equivalent value" only applies to the
Federal Bankruptcy Code, and thus challenges under state foreclosure law that the price
received at a foreclosure sale was so low as to "shock the conscience" .of the court are still
viable, but are beyond the scope of this Note.
For a review of West Virginia cases utilizing the "shock the conscience" test, the
following are suggested: Lallance v. Fisher, 2 S.E. 775 (W. Va. 1887) (upholding sale for
one-half of the estimated value); Copelan v. Sohn, 82 S.E. 1016 (W. Va. 1912) (upholding
sale for one-half of the estimated value); Pence v. Jamison, 94 S.E. 383 (W. Va. 1917)
(upholding sale for three-fourths of the estimated value); Rife v. Woolfolk, 289 S.E.2d 220
(W. Va. 1982) (setting aside sale for one-seventh of the estimated value); Tudor v. Tudor,
298 S.E.2d 108 (W. Va. 1982) (setting aside sale for more than one-seventh of the estimat-
ed value); Benavides v. Shenandoah Fed. Say., 433 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1993) (upholding
sale for approximately 48% of the estimated value).
282 [Vol. 97:255
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foreclosure laws or whether the sale "shocks the conscience" of a court
in equity.
According to Thomas H. Gilpin,"6 8 some lenders in West Virgin-
ia had already been supplanting the West Virginia Code's minimum
notice requirements in an attempt to attract as many bidders as possible
to the sale.'69 Most commentators agree that inadequate notice of the
sale is a major factor in realizing a low price at a foreclosure sale. 7'
Unless potential bidders are aware of the sale, there will be no com-
petitive bidding, and low prices will continue to be realized. The extra
preparation costs may reduce the chance of litigation and save the
expense and frustration of having a sale later invalidated.
An additional concern is that the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has, in certain cases, held that merely following an ap-
plicable statute does not always guarantee success when the applicable
statute is deficient or the result is inequitable. 7' Therefore, lenders
should anticipate close scrutiny of their foreclosure sale procedures if a
debtor or an unsecured creditor believes the sale was unfair. Extra
steps with regard to notice provide a good way to stifle such challeng-
es by providing debtors and unsecured creditors with the opportunity to
bid at the sale and lessening their challenge before the court.'
168. See supra note 152.
169. Gilpin, supra note 153.
170. Glaves, supra note 129, at 691; Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass:
Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An Empirical Study of Mortgage
Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 891 (1985); Woodruff, supra
note 36, at 797.
171. See Lilly v. Duke, 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988) (involving statutory provision
for forfeiture of delinquent lands); State ex rel. Thomas v. Neal, 299 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va.
1982) (holding statutory allowance of posting notice on the door insufficient); Cordell v.
Jarrett, 301 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1982) (setting aside otherwise valid and enforceable default
judgment); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770, 777 (W. Va. 1972) (overruling
statutory distress provision).
172. See Benavides v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. Bank, 433 S.E.2d 528, 531 (W. Va. 1993)
(contention of inadequate sale price whs "slightly weakened" by failure of appellant to bid at
the sale despite her presence there).
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Completeness is the key to providing sufficient notice in a West
Virginia foreclosure sale. The more information provided, the less
likely a court will find collusion or a violation of the applicable stat-
utes. Therefore, although notices frequently omit the name of the bene-
ficiary (mortgagee) of the trust deed, it is a better practice to include
the name of the beneficiary in the notice to fully comply with the
statutory requirement of Section 38-1-4(b).173 Additionally, depending
on the various circumstances of each sale, statutory notice requirements
may be supplemented with some of the following information regard-
ing the authority to sell or the terms of sale: (1) a recital that relief
from stay has been obtained, if applicable; (2) a statement that the
trustee shall have the right to adjourn the sale by oral proclama-
tion; 74 (3) any known prior liens; (4) any provisions necessary to
handle the sale of multiple parcels under a single deed of trust, if
applicable; (5) any exceptions for prior liens, whether known or un-
known;' (6) disclosure of any IRS right of redemption.
7
1
Regarding the West Virginia Code requirements of service, 7 7 al-
though not specifically required by the statute, all guarantors or other
persons obligated in any way on the debt in question should be served
with a copy of the notice of sale. Additionally, all lienholders of re-
cord after the recording of the deed of trust in question should be
served a copy of the notice of sale.'78
Other commentators have suggested using the standard real estate
advertising methods instead of the obscure and unattractive legal de-
scriptions to attract more potential bidders.'79 Also, because few po-
173. Gilpin, supra note 153.
174. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-3 (1985). This right must have been given in the trust deed.
175. The following language is frequently used to make an exception for prior liens:
"The terms of sale, cash in hand paid, but subject to any and all assessments and taxes
against said property, and all prior liens and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever."
Gilpin, supra note 153.
176. Language can be used to the effect that "the sale is subject to the right of the
Internal Revenue Service to reserve the property by § 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended." Gilpin, supra note 153.
177. W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (Supp. 1994).
178. Gilpin, supra note 153.
179. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto
Strict Foreclosure - An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale,
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tential buyers will be willing to bid on property they have not seen,
the subject property could be made available for inspection with dates
and times provided in the notice of sale.1"' Additionally, other com-
mentators suggest that title information should be made available be-
fore the sale to afford potential buyers the opportunity to determine
what, if any, encumbrances are against the property."'
The foregoing suggestions are not specifically required by the
West Virginia Code. Given, however, that BFP will place an increased
emphasis on the foreclosure sale procedure, and that the last revision to
any part of the applicable state law was in 1987,182 it may be bene-
ficial for either the West Virginia legislature, the West Virginia Law
Institute, or the West Virginia Bankers Association to look again at the
statutory procedures for foreclosure of property. Absent this, a lender
should consider the foregoing suggestions before each sale and deter-
mine which, if any, should be utilized. These additional steps may
encourage competitive bidding and thereby avert a subsequent factual
dispute or challenge of collusion or fraudulent conveyance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in BFP that the price received at a
noncollusive, properly conducted foreclosure sale conclusively estab-
lishes "reasonably equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A),
restored a sense of confidence in the finality of forced sales and freed
mortgagees from the burden of requiring a specified percentage of fair
market value in order to sell foreclosed property. The majority in BFP
defined "reasonably equivalent value" as meaning something different
than "fair market value." It coupled this focus with its view that in the
70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 892 (1985).
180. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 799 (citing Wechsler, supra note 179, at 891-92;
Glaves, supra note 129, at 691); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/15-1507(c)(1)(E)
(Smith-Hurd 1993).
181. Ehrlich, supra note 44, at 979.
182. In 1987, W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4, which deals with the notice of sale requirements
under vendor and trust deed liens, was completely rewritten.
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context of a forced sale, prices are routinely less than fair market value
and that protecting the security of real estate title is an essential state
interest. The dissent refused to depart from what it found to be the
plain meaning of the statute and disputed the majority's view that
"clearer textual guidance" is needed before state law can be preempt-
ed.18
3
While BFP will significantly increase the lender's freedom in
bidding at forced sales, lenders may still encounter the efforts of trust-
ees in bankruptcy to use state foreclosure law to set aside noncollusive
foreclosure sales where procedures are not strictly followed. Therefore,
it is imperative that lenders know and follow closely the state law
foreclosure requirements, and in some cases surpass these minimum
requirements to help ensure the finality of the sale.
Audy M Perry, Jr. *
183. Klein, supra note 116, at 6.
* The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Professor John W. Fisher, 11,
of the West Virginia University College of Law and Mr. Thomas H. Gilpin, Partner, of
Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, W. Va., for their help and guidance
in the preparation of this article.
[Vol. 97:255
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss1/10
